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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 brought real estate boom-bust cycles to the fore of policy 
discussions and academic circles. What triggered the illiquidity and, ultimately, solvency 
problems in the financial sector that rocked the markets and brought the global economy to 
the brink was the downturn in the U.S. residential real estate. During the boom years, first-
time buyers (and sometimes speculators) had taken advantage of the relaxation in lending 
standards to obtain loans with little down-payment requirements and back-loading features 
such as negative amortization schemes. Existing homeowners also utilized the easy credit 
conditions as refinancing activity, frequently with cash-out options, picked up. When house 
prices started to fall, an increasing number of homeowners, including not only speculators 
but also owner-occupiers, were quickly pushed to the negative-equity territory. Defaults 
increased as strategic default incentives kicked in and homeowners facing difficulty to afford 
their mortgage payments because of interest rate resets were unable to refinance. Losses 
reflected in loan portfolios carried over to the valuation of mortgage-backed securities. 
Unconventional policy measures were taken to provide liquidity and, soon after, to ensure 
survival of key financial institutions. 
 
Prior to the crisis, when it came to dealing with asset price booms, the widely-accepted tenet 
was one of ‘benign neglect’, namely, to wait for the bust and pick up the pieces (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 2001). Yet, the crisis and its formidable costs shifted the balance to the opposite 
camp favoring pre-emptive policy actions that could stop bubbles or, at least, could contain 
the damage to the financial sector and the broader economy when the bust comes. In other 
words, many policymakers now think that it is better to act than wait on the sidelines because 
the cost of inaction may greatly exceed the potential negative side effects of policy 
intervention. But, many still agree that monetary policy is too blunt a tool to be the best 
response (Posen, 2009). Then, in the quest to better design the policy toolkit to deal with real 
estate booms and busts, macroprudential tools such as maximum limits on loan-to-value 
ratios (LTV) and debt-to-income ratios (DTI) are heavily advocated (see Crowe et al., 2011a, 
on pros and cons of various policy options). This has led several countries to recently adopt 
such limits or measures that would discourage high-LTV/DTI loans (Table 1; also see Crowe 
et al., 2011b, and IMF, 2011, for a summary of specific country cases on macroprudential 
measures). 
 
But, especially from an empirical perspective, we know little about the impact of these 
measures that have become popular with many regulators after the crisis. Theoretically, 
limits on LTV and DTI can kill two birds with one stone: they can curb the feedback loop 
between mortgage credit availability and house price appreciation, and, by restraining 
household leverage, they can help reduce the incidence and loss given default of residential 
mortgage loan delinquencies. These mechanics are at work in many theoretical models such 
as the one in, for instance, Ambrose et al. (1997) and, more recently, in Allen and Carletti 
(2010). Econometric analyses analyzing their effects, however, have been relatively lacking. 
Lament and Stein (1999) and Almeida et al. (2006) provide evidence that economic activity 
is more sensitive to house price movements if LTV is higher. Duca et al. (2010) estimate that 
a 10-percentage-point decrease in LTV of mortgage loans for first-time buyers is associated 
with a 10 percentage point decline in house price appreciation rate. Crowe at el. (2011b) 
confirm the positive association between LTV at origination and subsequent price 
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appreciation using state-level data in the U.S. Wong et al. (2004) argue that, in Hong Kong 
SAR, losses in the financial sector in the wake of the Asian crisis were limited because of 
low LTVs, in line with the finding that LTV at origination is an important determinant of 
loan default (see, for instance, Avery et al., 1996). Wong et al. (2011) present some cross-
country evidence, at the aggregate level, that low LTVs can reduce delinquencies in response 
to economic downturns and property price busts. One reason for the little empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of LTV/DTI limits used as macroprudential tools is the fact that use of 
mandatory limits on these loan eligibility criteria especially in an actively-managed manner 
in response to cyclical movements in real estate markets has a short history and only a few 
countries, namely, Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and Malaysia (at varying degrees of 
complexity), have adopted such frameworks. 
 
This paper examines the impact of LTV and DTI limits on house price dynamics, residential 
real estate market activity, and household leverage in Korea. First, a regional dataset is used 
to exploit the variation across regions with different LTV/DTI limits in effect at different 
points in time. Second, and more innovatively, we use a unique dataset gathered from annual 
surveys conducted by Kookmin Bank and complemented with information from the Bank of 
Korea. This unique dataset covers information on the housing tenure and mortgage decisions 
of roughly 2000 households each year and runs from 2001 to 2009. We ask two questions. 
First, what happens when LTV/DTI limits are adjusted in response to developments 
perceived to be risky? Second, can we quantify the impact of LTV and DTI limits on housing 
and mortgage activity?  
 
We find that transaction activity drops significantly in the three-month period following the 
tightening of LTV/DTI regulations. Price appreciation slows down a bit later, in a six-month 
window rather than the three-month window. Moreover, price dynamics appear to be reined 
in more after LTV tightening rather than DTI tightening. Survey data analysis using a 
matching estimator framework offers some insight into what the channel for the impact of the 
policy actions may be: expected house price increases in the future become lower after policy 
intervention and this is more prevalent among older households while plans to purchase of a 
home are more likely to be postponed by those who already own a property, i.e., potential 
speculators, but not by those who do not own a property, i.e., potential first-time home 
buyers. These findings suggest that tighter limits on loan eligibility criteria, especially on 
LTV, curb expectations and speculative incentives.  
 
In terms of magnitude, our analysis point to sizeable impact on transaction activity and house 
price appreciation. More specifically, average drop in transaction activity in the three-month 
period following a tightening of macroprudential regulations on loan eligibility criteria is 16 
percent for LTV and 21 percent for DTI. Appreciation rates decrease by a monthly rate of 0.5 
percent against a historical monthly change of 0.4 percent in the six-month window 
following a tightening of LTV. The larger impact on transaction activity may indicate that 
most of the effect of these actively-managed macroprudential tools falls on the quantity in the 
market rather than the prices, raising concern that the price discovery process is hurt by the 
measures because some of the buyers and sellers decide to (temporarily) exit the market, but 
it may also be just an artifact of the adjustment mechanism in real estate markets where 
transactions respond first and prices adjust at a slower pace. We do not find as strong an 
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effect on growth rates of mortgage loan originations and household debt levels, perhaps 
reflecting the slow-moving nature of these variables. 
 
Our contribution to the literature comes not only from the study of a timely and interesting 
topic that has not yet been studied in depth but also the use of disaggregated data in the 
empirical analysis.  Wong et al. (2011) look at the responses in aggregates, as we do in the 
first part of our analysis, but it is hard to infer causal links from such cross-country analysis. 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to look into the effects of actively-
managed macroprudential regulation on loan eligibility using information at the household 
level. By exploiting variation across households, we can go beyond the correlation between 
macroprudential tools and housing market developments and assess the causal impact of 
LTV and DTI limits. 
 
Policy implications of our analysis are encouraging but should be taken with a grain of salt. 
In housing markets, expectations are key as they often facilitate the settling in of bubble 
dynamics (Allen and Carletti, 2010). If, as suggested by the evidence presented here, limits 
on LTV and DTI curb expectations and discourage potential speculators, they can be 
effective tools to tame real estate booms and contain the associated risks. Having said that, 
the analysis provides only a partial assessment of the LTV and DTI regulations. The broader 
housing policy has implications for the mismatches between housing supply and demand, as 
well as for maintaining expectations of slow but steady house price appreciation. Hence, 
macroprudential regulations may be treating the symptoms of distortions caused by these 
other policies. The lack of evidence on any impact on the growth rate of mortgage debt may 
suggest that LTV and DTI regulations indeed are not fully effective in reining in the buildup 
of excess leverage, which remains attractive because of the other policies in place. In 
addition, the individual welfare costs of excluding some households from the housing market 
would be outweighed by an aggregate welfare gain if the tightening of LTV/DTI prevents or 
curbs a bubble, the detection of which remains a difficult task. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides brief background 
information on Korean housing and mortgage markets. Section III gives the details of the 
dataset, describes the empirical approach, and presents the findings. Section IV concludes. 
 
II.   BACKGROUND: KOREAN HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS 
A.   Basic Facts 
Residential Real Estate Sector and Housing Finance 
 
Administratively, Korea is categorized into nine provinces. 
Urban areas include Seoul (the capital city) and six big cities 
known as “Gwangyeok cities”. 
Economically, however, the 
country is better characterized by 
three areas (Text Figure): Seoul 
(shown in red), Metropolitan Area 
excluding Seoul, composed of 
Text Figure. Map of Republic of 
Korea and Seoul 
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Incheon, one of the six Gwangyeok cities, and the remainder of the Gyeonggi province 
(shown in blue), and Non-Metropolitan Area which includes the remaining five Gwangyeok 
cities (shown in green) as well as the rural areas scattered in the remaining eight provinces 
(white). Seoul can be further divided into two areas (geograhically marked by the Han 
River): the northern part (Gangbuk, traced by black lines) and the southern part (Gangnam, 
traced by blue lines). In the latter, “Gangnam Three” (traced by red lines), which includes the 
three major boroughs (Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu), stands out as the most desirable 
area to reside in as it is host to high-quality urban structures including schools. As a result, 
this area has higher median home prices and has experienced the largest increases and 
fluctuations in house prices over the last couple of decades, making it to top of the watch list 
of the supervisors. 
 
The residential real estate market in Korea has gone through significant change in the past 
two decades. A government-led drive to build two million new dwellings between 1988 and 
1992 helped alleviate the housing shortage and make homes more affordable. Beginning in 
1995, price controls on new apartments and regulations on the conversion of agricultural land 
were gradually reduced, propelling urbanization. The ratio between the number of housing 
units and the number of households has increased nationwide from 72 percent in 1990 to 
109.9 percent in 2008 while consumption of housing space per capita rose from 13.8 square 
meters in 1990 to 22.8 in 2005 (Kim and Cho, 2010). Still, mismatches between supply and 
demand remain in some regions, most notably, southern Seoul. The majority of housing stock 
consists of apartments, rather than single-family homes, reflecting the high urbanization rate 
(68 percent of households live in urban areas with almost 70 percent of these living the 
metropolitan area). Homeownership rate, standing at around 55.6 percent as of 2005, is in the 
lowest quartile among OECD countries. Given the somewhat stagnant population growth, 
gross value added by the construction industry (as a percent of the total value added) has 
been declining since the late 1990s but remains higher than many advanced countries at 
about 6.6 percent. Affordability, as measured by price-to-income ratio, has improved in 
comparison to the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
The housing finance system in Korea was deregulated in second half of the 1990s. 
Particularly, commercial banks entered the mortgage business in 1996 followed by the 
privatization of the Korean Housing Bank (KHB), the monopolistic provider of low-interest, 
long-term housing loans, in 1997.2 Before the deregulation of the housing finance system, 
more than 80 percent of mortgage loans was held by the publicly-owned National Housing 
Fund (NHF) (Chang, 2010).3  
 
As a consequence of the deregulation, outstanding mortgage debt grew considerably from a 
roughly 12 percent in 1996 and now amounts to slightly more than 30 percent of GDP. The 
                                                 
2 KHB’s name was changed to Housing and Commercial Bank (H&CB) in 1996 and the entity was privatized in 
1997. H&CB merged with Kookmin Bank in 2001. 
3 The NHF continues to offer services to lower-income households by securing money through bond issuance 
and housing subscription savings for building rental homes, helping people take out housing loans, and 
improving the residential environment. 
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prevalent loan type carries an adjustable rate and 56 percent LTV at origination. While 
maturities up to 20 years are common, the majority of mortgages are “bullet loans”, which 
require full payment or refinancing after a 3-year period. Banks dominate the mortgage 
market with a market share exceeding 80 percent. Deposit-based financing remains the norm, 
although mortgage-backed-security issuance has grown to 5.8 percent of total mortgage debt 
outstanding in 2010 since the establishment of the Korean Housing Finance Corporation 




One of the lessons policymakers in Korea, and a few other Asian economies, took away from 
the crisis in 1997-98 was that asset price and credit booms, and the ensuing busts, can be 
devastating. Moreover, the credit card bubble, which had emerged partly owing to the 
expansionary policy measures aiming to stimulate the economy in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, burst in 2003. Delinquencies rose sharply and economic growth took a hit as 
consumer spending shrunk. This demonstrated, once again, the need to monitor systemic 
risks and contain distress that can emerge from common exposures and feedback loops 
between the financial and real sectors, i.e., macroprudential supervision, since micro-
prudential supervision focusing only on the soundness of individual financial institutions 
proved to be insufficient in satisfying this need.  
 
Accordingly, as one of the first cases to tackle from a macroprudential perspective, the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) took on the real estate markets starting in late 2002. 
LTV limits were introduced first, followed by DTI limits in 2005. The same year, in an effort 
to further improve macroprudential supervision, the FSS created the Macroprudential 
Supervision Department, with the mandate to assess systemic risk factors using early 
warning systems and stress tests to guide prudential policies. 
 
As a result of these developments, housing and mortgage markets in Korea have been heavily 
influenced by policy interventions. In general, stable house prices, defined as annual house 
price appreciation rates within the zero and nominal GDP growth rate band, have been an 
overarching policy objective along with the goals of assisting urbanization and providing 
affordable housing options to low-income households. Strict regulations on land use and 
redevelopment also affect the real estate market dynamics by holding back prompt supply 
response. The battery of policy tools to accomplish the objective of stable house prices 
include adjustments in LTV and DTI limits as well as moral suasion on lenders, subsidies to 
housing finance, changes in taxes, direct support for the private construction sector, and 
government supply of new housing units or purchase of existing units. In our empirical 
analysis, we keep the focus on LTV and DTI limits but also check the robustness of the 
                                                 
4 KHFC purchases long-term mortgages from commercial banks in order to provide liquidity and increase the 
duration of loans available on the market.  By the end of March 2010, KFHC's total mortgage-backed security 
issuances amounted to 5.8% of Korea's total mortgage debt outstanding (Chung, 2010). There has also been 




findings by considering major changes in other policies as control variables in the 
regressions, including monetary policy stance.5 
 
B.   Recent Market Developments and Policy Responses 
Between 2001 and 2010 (our sample period), Korea experienced two major housing cycles 
split by the trough in March 2005 (Figure 1).6 House prices (together with transaction 
activity) and mortgage loan growth tend to move in the same direction, demonstrating the 
two-way feedback loop documented in the literature (see Crowe et al., 2011b, and references 
therein).  
 
Price and credit dynamics have been driven, in addition to supply and demand conditions, by 
often policy-induced restraints on lending standards.7 These dynamics vary across 
geographical regions, and so has the policy response.8 Since their launch in September 2002 
and August 2005, respectively, the LTV and DTI limits have been changed several times not 
only in terms of the levels themselves but also in terms of the areas and the financial 
institutions to which they are applicable. Tables 2a and 2b give detailed information, 
including the timeline, on the LTV and DTI regulations, respectively. 
 
In the first cycle, real estate emerged as a preferred asset class in the wake of the IT bubble 
burst. As monetary policy eased to give a boost to the economy and financial institutions, 
burnt by corporate bankruptcies, rebalanced their loan portfolios by extending credit to 
households aggressively, returns to housing in comparison to bank deposits and corporate 
bonds surged. Policymakers took action starting in September 2002 with the introduction of 
the 60 percent LTV limit (maximum allowed). House price appreciation decelerated 
significantly from more than 20 percent on a year-on-year basis to 9 percent in six months, 
but accelerated again eliciting tightening of LTV limits twice (Figure 2).9 The second 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, De Nicolo et al. (2010) and references therein on how monetary policy can affect incentives 
for risk taking in financial institutions. Such effects may have the potential to undo the impact of more strict 
financial regulation. 
6 Since the last trough in April 2009, prices bounced back rather quickly but started declining again in July 
2010, at least in part due to the tightening of LTV/DTI limits and moral suasion on banks to keep mortgage loan 
growth rates in check. The policy response has been reversed in August 2010 and mortgage lending and house 
prices resumed their ascent in late 2010.  
7 One concern often voiced by opponents of frequent adjustments to loan eligibility criteria by policymakers is 
the increased volatility in prices.  
8 See Appendix for a detailed description of geographical regions and their main socio-economic characteristics 
as well as the variation in policy response applicable to loans of different characteristics and in different 
regions. 
9 We use the official apartment prices index from the Korea National Statistical Office throughout our analysis. 
Measuring house prices is a notoriously hard task and discrepancy in quantification of house price changes is 
unavoidable when series from different sources are used (Igan and Loungani, 2011). See Appendix for a 
comparison of different price series in Korea. 
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tightening was accompanied by tax measures, which included changing the basis for capital 
gains tax calculations to real transaction price and increasing the capital gains taxes for 
owners of multiple properties, marked the beginning of the downturn phase.  The decline in 
prices gained pace with the restitution of development gains on housing construction projects 
in June 2004. 
 
The second cycle set in as monetary policy took an accommodative stance again, this time in 
response to the financial distress due to the credit card debacle. Other factors pushing prices 
up were increasing competition among lenders and release of large land compensation funds 
under various urban development initiatives. With higher capital gains taxes discouraging 
potential sellers, a shortage of homes for sale followed. Policy response came quickly in 
various forms reining in part of the exuberance in early 2007. Prices slid further as the global 
financial crisis hit but recovered as early as the second half of 2009. The authorities 
intervened again in October 2009 and markets remained cooled down through the third 
quarter of 2010. As bubble concerns turned into “excessive cooling”, some of the measures 
were loosened in August 2010. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to analyze how the introduction of the LTV and DTI regulations, designed to set 
limits on the leverage taken by homebuyers and in turn reduce housing demand and stabilize 
prices, we gather data both at the macro and micro levels. We first describe the analysis and 
present the findings for the macro-level data (subsection III.A) and then the micro-level data 
(subsection III.B). This allows us utilize both the cross-sectional and the time-series variation 
in our datasets in an effort to tease out a relationship that goes beyond simple correlations in 
our analysis of the impact the policy interventions in Tables 2a and 2b.  
 
A.   Effects of LTV and DTI Limits on Regional Housing and Mortgage Market Activity 
At the macro level, aggregate series for house prices, transaction volumes, and mortgage 
loans are obtained from the Bank of Korea and the Korea National Statistical Office. Time 
coverage is restricted to the 2002-10 period, when macroprudential policy interventions were 
actively used. Additionally, we get information from the Realtors Association on the 
“dominance of selling”, that is, the proportion of realtors reporting that the number of sellers 
exceeds the number of buyers. All macro-level data are available at monthly frequency.  
 
At the regional level, the regulatory limits are set separately for “speculative zones” and non-
speculative zones”. An area is designated as a speculative zone if the following criteria are 
satisfied: 
 
 monthly nominal house price index (HPI) rose more than 1.3 times nationwide 
inflation rate (CPI) during the previous month, and 
 either (i) the average of the HPI appreciation rates in the previous two months was 
higher than 1.3 times the average of the national HPI appreciation rates in the 
previous two months, or (ii) the average of the month-on-month HPI appreciation 
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rates over the previous year was higher than the average of the month-on-month 
national HPI appreciation rates over the previous three years. 
We look at the differences in the responses of housing market activity and mortgage loan 
originations across these regional divides before and after a change in the LTV and DTI 
regulations take effect. The baseline regression is 
 
௥ܸ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚԢܺ௥௧ ൅ ߛܦ௥௧ ൅ ߝ௥௧ 
 
where ௥ܸ௧ is the variable of interest in housing and mortgage markets, i.e., the house price 
appreciation rate, number of transactions, mortgage loan growth rate, and dominance of 
selling in region r at time t. ܺ௥௧ is a matrix of control variables including indicators of the 
level of general economic activity, monetary policy stance, and measures of tightness and 
expectations in housing markets. This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) for each variable of interest separately. ܦ௥௧ is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of 1 in the six months following the announcement of a rule change. We also construct 
this dummy for one or three months after the rule change and one, three, or six months before 
a rule change. Looking at the responses of markets at these various windows helps us assess 
the horizon over which a policy intervention has an effect as well as find out whether the 
anticipation of a policy intervention, rather than the specifics of a rule change per se, triggers 
a response in the markets.  
 
We split the analysis into two parts and examine interventions that tighten the existing 
regulations and those that loosen them separately. There were 13 interventions in total, 6 of 
which were related to LTV and 7 related to DTI, in the period we are examining. Of these 13 
interventions, 3 (one LTV-related and two DTI-related) loosened the existing regulations. 
Hence, we are left with 10 tightening interventions, five on LTV and five on DTI regulations, 
in the first part of the analysis and 3 loosening interventions in the second part. 
 
There are two issues that deserve further investigation by modifying the baseline 
specification. First, notice that the estimated difference in housing market activity before and 
after the policy intervention in this specification is compared to the sample average. In other 
words, we identify the impact of the policy interventions as the change in housing market 
activity relative to its average over the whole sample period. Therefore, it is likely that the 
impact is underestimated. In order to examine the response in housing market activity after 
each intervention more accurately, we run the specification with a separate dummy for each 
intervention.  
 
Second, note that this specification combines all interventions and, hence, treats them as 
identical without distinguishing the interventions in terms of their scope (e.g., only applicable 
to banks versus applicable to all financial institutions) and strength (e.g., a change of 10 
percentage points in the level of LTV/DTI limit versus a change of 5 percentage points). In 
order to take into account the fact that each intervention is different because of e.g. the 
number of lenders and borrowers it affects and in the degree it changes the existing rules, we 
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construct an index,  ܫ௥௧, based on the regions and types of lender, borrower, property, and 
loan to which the rule change is applicable.10 In this case, the empirical specification is  
 
௥ܸ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚԢܺ௥௧ ൅ ߮ܫ௥௧ ൅ ߝ௥௧ 
 
Admittedly, the decision to tighten a particular regulation in an area or to change the 
designation of an area to a speculative zone is not an exogenous one: areas showing signs of 
overheating are more likely to be subject to a tightening. Moreover, as shown by numerous 
studies, there generally is a two-way relationship between house prices and mortgage credit 
as well as between house prices and business cycle movements. Hence, note that it is difficult 
to tease out the causal effect of LTV and DTI limit adjustments in this setup. We analyze 
such a causal effect in the next subsection using household level information.  
 
At a first glance, average appreciation rate in house prices and growth rate of transactions 
and household debt levels, calculated on a month-on-month basis, drop considerably 
following a tightening in the rules governing LTV and/or DTI limits (Figure 3). Decline in 
the growth of number of transactions is particularly striking compared to the other variables 
of interest. Also interesting is to note that the experience in metropolitan areas is starkly 
different from the experience in the non-metropolitan areas. Hence, when we look into the 




Price appreciation rates are significantly lower following the implementation of an LTV rule 
tightening (Table 3a, first column). Moreover, this effect is only observable in the 
metropolitan areas, where tighter rules are more likely be applicable. Hence, while still 
plausible, it is less likely that the negative and significant coefficients on the LTV tightening 
dummy are driven by nationwide developments over time. The evidence for DTI tightening 
is not as strong: while the coefficients for all windows (one, three, or six months) are 
negative, they are not statistically significant. 
 
There appears to be some positive association between price appreciation prior to an LTV 
rule tightening and the implementation of the rule change. While this may be an indication of 
anticipation of the rule changes by market participants, it is hard to rule out reverse causality: 
the tightening decision is based on recent price changes in the market. 
 
On the flip side, the response in house price appreciation rates is less visible when rules are 
loosened (Table 3b, first column). Actually, it looks like there is a negative association 
between house price changes and more lax rules: LTV dummy at rule change announcement 
and DTI dummy for the month following the rule change have negative and significant 
coefficients. While counterintuitive at first, this association can be explained by the policy 
intervention decision being based on what has been happening in the housing market and 
inertia in prices. The coefficient for the LTV reverses at the one-month window, but the 
                                                 
10 See Appendix for a detailed description of how the index is constructed. 
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coefficient is small in magnitude compared to tightening of the rules in Table 3a. Taken 
together, these seem to suggest that bringing a (temporary) halt to exuberance in housing and 




Growth in the number of transactions shoots up with the announcement of a tightening in 
loan eligibility criteria and plunges in the following months (Table 3a, third column).11 
Especially with a DTI tightening, the hit from the tightening appears to be borne mostly by 
transactions rather than prices. This may have important implications depending on the 
mechanism behind. More specifically, if the stronger response in transaction activity is just 
an artifact of the workings of housing markets, where quantity adjustment comes before price 
adjustment, macroprudential rules, especially LTV, appear to be effective tools to curb 
excessive house price appreciation. But, if this is a reflection of potential buyers and sellers 
exiting the market, the price discovery process, which already is slow in real estate markets, 
may become impaired. Further implications related to welfare concerns may follow in this 
case: it may be the potential first-time home buyers being forced out of the market by lower 
limits on LTV and DTI, and reduced access to finance by these often younger and less 
wealthy groups may create social and political frictions. In our analysis of survey data, we 
examine the characteristics of the households that are more affected by the policy 




Since we do not have mortgage loan data broken down by regions, we examine the changes 
in household debt levels instead. To the extent that financial decisions are determined 
together, mortgage loans and other loans to households will tend to move together.  
 
Perhaps reflecting the slow-moving nature of balance sheet measures, we do not find much 
evidence of the expected negative association between the growth of household leverage and 
tightening of macroprudential rules. Contrary to the findings on prices and transactions, DTI 
appears to be more closely linked to the evolution of household debt levels. Furthermore, the 
symmetric effect seem to exist with loosening of DTI rules but, again, not with LTV. This is 
somewhat surprising given that LTV appeals more to leverage and strategic default 
incentives whereas DTI is considered to appeal more to affordability. One explanation could 
be that, since payments on loans other than mortgages are included in the calculation of DTI, 
households are forced to consolidate their debt in order to get approved for a mortgage loan. 
This process may end up reducing the overall household debt levels although outstanding 




                                                 
11 In regressions not reported here, we find that this effect disappears at the twelve-month window. 
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Dominance of Selling 
 
There is some evidence that the residential real estate market becomes more seller-dominated 
following the changes, both tightening and loosening, in loan eligibility criteria (Tables 3a 
and 3b, seventh columns). DTI appears to be more effective in turning the marketplace from 
being buyer-dominated to seller-dominated when it is a tightening while LTV seems to have 
stronger support for such an effect in the loosening case. This may be indicating that 
potential buyers that are at the margin in terms of their affordability constraints get out of the 
market when DTI limit is lowered but they are not as easily persuaded back into the market 
with the loosening whereas the developers flood the market when LTV limit is raised. 
 
In sum, the empirical analysis of macro data shows that macroprudential rules are followed 
by a large drop in transaction activity and they may be effective in taming rapid house price 
appreciation rates. These seem to apply more closely to LTV regulations. When we repeat 
the regressions by introducing a separate dummy variable for each policy intervention, the 
broad picture is not altered, yet it is clear that not all interventions work the same way or to 
the same extent (Tables 4a and 4b). As explained earlier, to incorporate the differences 
among these interventions and reflect their varying strength, we construct an index with 
higher values corresponding to tighter regulation. The results, however, are not significant.12 
This insignificance, aside from issues related to the construction of such an index, may be 
indicative of macroprudential tools working through expectations rather than by creating a 
one-to-one impact commensurate with their strength. 
 
B.   Effects of LTV and DTI Limits on Household Choices 
At the micro level, we utilize information on individual households using the Survey on 
Mortgages and Housing Demand conducted annually by Kookmin Bank. This dataset covers 
the period from 2001 to 2009 and around 3000 households each year across the nation. 
Disproportional stratified sampling is the method used in conducting the survey. To put it 
more precisely, households are first divided by region using regional population as weights 
and then the survey participants are selected randomly within each region. The dataset 
includes information on the households’ socio-economic and demographic background (e.g., 
age, education level, income level, balance sheet position) as well as their plans on housing 
tenure and expectations on house prices. 
 
In order to estimate the average effect on property buying decisions and perceptions on the 
direction of house prices, we distinguish between two types of households: those who are 
subject to a particular rule change, i.e., those that are given treatment, and those that are not. 
Let  ܥ௜ଵ and ܥ௜଴ denote the outcome variable for household i with treatment and without, 
respectively. Note that for each household we only observe the outcome in one state or the 
other. Further, let the conditional expectations of these variables, given a vector of 
observable characteristics ௜ܺ, be  given by ௜ܺߜଵ and ௜ܺߜ଴, where ߜଵ and ߜ଴ are unknown 
                                                 
12 These regressions results are omitted here for sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request. 
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parameters. Defining ௜ܶ ൌ 1 if household i received treatment and ௜ܶ ൌ 0 if not, the observed 
outcome can be written as  
ܥ௜  ൌ ௜ܶܥ௜ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௜ܶ ሻܥ௜଴.  
 
Although whether a household receives treatment or not is not random and potentially 
endogenous to the outcome variable, it is possible to estimate the effect of getting the 
treatment while accounting for its endogeneity is possible using the techniques described in 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Abadie and Imbens (2006). Specifically, the 
problem is one of missing data. For each household i, we do not observe the counterfactual 
so we cannot compare the outcome with and without treatment. But we can find another 
household whose characteristics are similar but who were not exposed to the LTV/DTI rule 
changes and associate the missing outcome to the outcome for that household. In other 
words, we first match the treated households to untreated households based on their 
observable characteristics and then compare the outcomes for the matched pairs to estimate 
the sample average treatment effect. 
 
We match the households that were subject to the tightening of loan eligibility criteria to 
those that were not using their income level, financial assets, debt, and the price of the 
property they live in.13 Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the treated and untreated 
groups before and after the matching procedure. Observably, the treated and the untreated 
have stark differences. The matching procedures eliminates these differences and the two 
subsamples are no longer statistically different. So, when we compare the outcomes for the 
treated and the untreated only using the matched pairs, the difference in the outcomes can be 
attributed to the treatment rather than to differences in observable characteristics, taking us a 
step further in interpreting this effect in a causal way rather than a simple correlation. 
 
Expectations and Demand for Housing 
 
Results from the matching estimator framework are presented in Table 6. On an experimental 
treatment effect basis, both LTV and DTI tightening are effective in delaying property 
purchase decisions. Such a policy intervention also pushes down price expectations but only 
in the case of LTV. These findings offer an interesting interpretation for the results on the 
aggregate data: the drop in transaction activity and the slowdown in house price appreciation 
rates following a tightening may work through the expectations channel. To put it more 
precisely, lowering LTV limits curbs agents’ expectations about future house price gains and 
alters their housing tenure and investment choices. Demand for homes drop as households 
believe they face lower returns to housing in the future, alleviating the pressure on prices. 
Interestingly, we find the opposite effect on expectations for DTI limits. One reason for this 
could be the fact that DTI works more closely through the affordability channel and a 
tightening of this measure may lead agents to believe that those who can now qualify for a 
mortgage loan are actually richer households and they would be able to pay more for the 
same house. 
                                                 
13 We run robustness tests using several sets of observable characteristics to do the matching. The results remain 




This finding is promising because the inertia in house prices and the difficulty of breaking 
bubble dynamics once they set in real estate markets have been pointed out to highlight what 
makes real estate cycles potentially dangerous. In particular, agents tend to revise their 
expectations of future house price changes in an adaptive manner and higher realized 
increases translate into higher expected increases. Expectations of better returns to housing 
push more households to buy today rather than tomorrow and, at the same time, attract 
speculators into the market. Hence, a self-fulfilling loop emerges until the house price levels 
breach affordability constraints and loop reverses. If macroprudential tools can affect 
expectations, they offer a viable option to put a backstop to this loop and, hence, to deal with 
real estate booms. 
 
Response to Policies and Characteristics of Households  
 
Although the negative impact on expectations and prospective demand is an intended 
consequence, one issue is whose expectations these macroprudential tools affect. A 
commonly-raised concern regarding LTV and DTI limits is that they may inadvertently target 
young couples or first-time home buyers. This is because both LTV and DTI impose direct 
financial constraints on the households’ ability to borrow and they tend to become binding 
for those with little savings to use as a downpayment or those with little income as they are at 
the beginning of their life cycle of earnings. The fact that the constrained households are easy 
to identify and the social goals associated with housing may pose important political 
challenges in implementing LTV and DTI limits. 
 
We split our sample to see if this is indeed an issue. First split is based on the age of the head 
of the household: we label those below 35 as “young” and others as “old”. The second split 
compares those who already own a property (“speculators”) to those that currently do not 
(“first-time home buyers”)14. Looking at the results in Table 7, it is not obvious that this is a 
problem in Korea’s experience. On the contrary, it is the older households and speculators 
(i.e., those who already own a property) that are influenced more by the policy interventions. 
This is again promising for efficacy of LTV as a macroprudential tool as they indicate that 
social issues associated with denying homeownership to young, first-time home buyers does 
not find support, at least, in the Korean case.15 Once again, we find the opposite effects for 
DTI when expectations are the variable of interest, but a similar results holds when we look 
at the demand for properties: limits on DTI lead to a delay of property purchase plans by the 
older households and speculators but not the young households or the (potential) first-time 
home buyers. 
 
                                                 
14 It is possible that the latter had owned property before. 
15 It could well be the case that these findings are specific to Korea and/or to a specific time period. But, an 
advantage of using LTV and DTI limits is that they can be tailored to protect certain households based on, e.g., 
income levels, allowing for them to achieve the goal of curbing a real estate boom and preserve financial system 
health while keeping up with broader social housing goals. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
We examine the impact of LTV and DTI limits on house price dynamics, residential real 
estate market activity, and household leverage in Korea. We find that transaction activity 
drops significantly in the three-month period following the tightening of LTV/DTI 
regulations. Price appreciation slows down a bit later, in a six-month window rather than the 
three-month window. Moreover, price dynamics appear to be reined in more after LTV 
tightening rather than DTI tightening. Survey data analysis using a matching estimator 
framework offers some insight into what the channel for the impact of the policy actions may 
be: expected house price increases in the future become lower after policy intervention and 
this is more prevalent among older households while plans to purchase of a home are more 
likely to be postponed by those who already own a property, i.e., potential speculators, but 
not by those who do not own a property, i.e., potential first-time home buyers. These findings 
suggest that tighter limits on loan eligibility criteria, especially on LTV, curb expectations 
and speculative incentives.  
 
Policy implications of our analysis are encouraging. In housing markets, expectations are key 
as they often facilitate the settling in of bubble dynamics. If, as suggested by the evidence 
presented here, limits on LTV curb expectations and discourage potential speculators, they 









Based on socio-economic characteristics, Korea is split into the two main areas: (1) Seoul 
Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon Gwangyeok city, and Gyeonggi province), and (2) Non-
Metropolitan Area (five Gwangyeok cities except Incheon and the remaining areas scatterred 
through eight provinces). Seoul is further divided into two areas: Gangbuk and Gangnam. 
Socio-economic characteristics of these regions are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Appendix Table 1. Basic Charateristics by Regions in Korea 
 As of 2005 Korea 
         
Seoul Metropolitan Area   Non-Metropolitan Area  
  
Seoul 






Area   Gangbuk Gangnam  
Size of Area (%) 100.0 11.8 0.6 - - 11.2 88.2 3.8 84.4
Population (10 
thousand) 4,704 2,262.1 976.3 487.2 489.0 1,285.9 2,442.0 986.6 1,455.5
  - Population Ratio by 
Region (%) 100.0 48.1 20.8 10.4 10.4 27.3 51.9 21.0 30.9
Population Growth 
Rate (%) 0.2 0.7 -0.3 - - 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0
Population Density 




1,588.7 746.2 331.0 165.0 166.0 415.2 842.5 327.9 514.6
 - Household Ratio by 
Region (%) 100.0 56.4 25.0 12.5 12.6 31.4 63.7 24.8 38.9
Number of House 
Units 1,562.3 716.5 310.2 - - 406.3 845.8 318.1 527.7
House Supply Rate 
(%) 98.3 96.0 93.7 - - 98.3 100.2 97.0 102.1
House Ownership 
Rate (%) 55.6 50.2 44.6 45.8 43.4 54.6 60.3 55.1 63.7
Type of Housing 
(Apartments) (%) 52.7 58.2 54.2 48.9 59.6 60.8 48.4 61.6 41.2
Median Apartment 
Price 
 (10 Thousand Won) 
23,470.4 35,388.5 51,177.0 38,773.7 61,530.7 26,864.8 11,277.15 13,381.5 9,172.8
Value of Land Stock 
(billion won) 2,753,001 1,757,436 867,136 - - 890,300 995,565 360,886 634,679
- Ratio by Region 
(%) 100.0 63.8 31.5 - - 32.3 36.2 13.1 23.1 
GDP (billion won) 869,304 418,612 208,899 - - 209,713 450,691 157,448 293,243
 - GDP Ratio by 
Region (%) 100.0 48.2 24.0 - - 24.1 51.8 18.1 33.7
Median Household 
Income (Gross) 
(10 thousand won) 
3,035.9 3,132.3 3,501.4 - - 2,947.8 2,800.6 2,928.9 2,720.3
Ratio of College 
Graduates (%) 35.5 41.4 46.0 40.5 51.4 37.7 30.4 36.2 26.6
Median Age 34.8 33.9 34.1 - - 33.8 35.7 33.9 36.8
Age of Household 





Even though Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA) occupies only 11.8 percent of the geographical 
area,  48.1 percent of the population and 56.4 percent of the households live in SMA. Most of 
the government offices, headquarters of private companies, prestigious universities, and 
cultural facilities are concentrated in this area. Almost half of the GDP (48.2 percent) and 
two-thirds of the housing wealth (63.8 percent) is accounted for by SMA. Compared to the 
Non-Metropolitan Area (NMA), unemployment rate and household gross incomes are higher 
by 1.3 percentage points and 11.8 percent, respectively. In the desirable Gangnam area, the 
median price for apartments, which is the most popular type of residence in the country, is 
2.6 times the median price in the country and is 6.7 times higher than the median apartment 




Chonsei is a unique housing rental system. It requires the renter to make a “key money 
deposit” of about 50 to 90 percent of the market value of the rental space instead of paying 
monthly rent. This deposit is returned in its entirety to the renter at the end of the contract, 
which usually lasts two or three years. Early termination of the contract requires another 
renter to replace the outgoing renter. This enables the owner to freely invest the deposit 
during the contract period. For the Chonsei system to work, interest rates need to remain 
high, renters have to have enough cash upfront, and owners need to return the money 
faithfully. High interest rates allow the owners to make a reasonable profit from the 
alternative investment. During the past decades, interest rates in Korea were relatively high, 
so the owners had strong incentives to run the Chonsei system. With house prices also 
starting to rise at high rates, some owners attained leverage to buy an additional property 
through the Chonsei system by using the Chonsei deposit to complement their downpayment.  
 
In 2005, 22.4 percent of Korean households lived in Chonsei. The ratio of Chonsei contracts 
in the Gangnam area was the highest with 33.5 percent and that in rural provinces was the 
lowest with 13.2 percent (Appendix Table 2). This is in line with the higher median 
apartment prices pushing more households to choose the Chonsei option as they cannot 
afford to buy the property.  
 
Appendix Table 2. Housing Tenure Types in 2005 
                                                                                                                                                          Unit: # of Household, % 
 Total Owned Chonsei Rented etc 
Korea 15,887,128 8,828,100 55.6 3,556,760 22.4 3,011,855 19.0 490,413 3.1 
SMA 7,462,090 3,744,978 50.2 2,172,612 29.1 1,379,158 18.5 165,342 2.2 
 - Seoul 3,309,890 1,475,848 44.6 1,100,175 33.2 679,980 20.5 53,887 1.6 
      - Gangbuk 1,649,566 754,814 45.8 543,823 33.0 322,888 19.6 28,041 1.7 
      - Gangnam 1,660,324 721,034 43.4 556,352 33.5 357,092 21.5 25,846 1.6 
   - Incheon & Gyeonggi 4,152,200 2,269,130 54.6 1,072,437 25.8 699,178 16.8 111,455 2.7 
NMA 8,425,038 5,083,122 60.3 1,384,148 16.4 1,632,697 19.4 325,071 3.9 
 - 5 Major Cities 3,279,013 1,806,645 55.1 702,559 21.4 686,506 20.9 83,303 2.5 







Appendix Table 3. Announcement Dates and Levels of LTV Limits across Loan Classes and Regions 
Date 
Classification 





Zone Other Areas 
Single Apartment Single Apartment Single Apartment
Before Sept.6, 
2002 
under 3 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3~10 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
over 10 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sept. 6, 2002 –  
Oct. 14, 2002 
under 3 years N/A N/A 60 60 N/A N/A 
3~10 years N/A N/A 60 60 N/A N/A 
over 10 years N/A N/A 60 60 N/A N/A 
Oct. 14, 2002 – 
May 23, 2003 
under 3 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
3~10 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
over 10 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
May 23, 2003 – 
Oct. 29, 2003 
under 3 years 50 50 50 50 60 60 
3~10 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
over 10 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Oct. 29, 2003 –   
Mar. 24, 2004 
under 3 years 50 40 50 50 60 60 
3~10 years 60 40 60 60 60 60 
over 10 years 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Mar. 24, 2004 – 
July 4, 2005 
under 3 years 50 40 50 50 60 60 




payment 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Amortized 
payment 70 70 70 70 70 70 
July 4, 2005 – 
Present 
under 3 years 50 40 50 50 60 60 




won 60 40 60 60 60 60 
Under 600mil 
won  60 60 60 60 60 60 
Amortized payment 












Single Apartment Single Apartment Single Apartment
July 4, 2009 – 
Present 
under 3 years 50 40 50 50 60 60 
3~10 years 60 40 60 50 60 60 
over 10 
years 
Over 600mil won 60 40 60 50 60 60 
Under 600mil won  60 60 60 60 60 60 
Amortized payment 





Appendix Table 4. List of Areas Designated Speculative Zone Status through Time 
Period Korea 
 
Seoul Metropolitan Area Non- 
Metropolitan 
Area Total 
Seoul Seoul Neighboring Area 
Total Gang nam 
Gang
buk Total Gyeonggi Incheon 
2001.1~2003.5          
2003.6    O   O   
2003.7~10  O O O  O O   
2003.11~2004.8 O O O O  O O   
2004.9~2006.1  O O O  O O   
2006.2~6 O O O O  O O   
2006.7~12 O O O O O O O   
2007.1~2008.11 O O O O O O O O  
2008.12~2010.12    X1      
1. Gangnam Three, which consists of three boroughs (Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu) in Gangnam area, 
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Appendix Table 5. Regulation Index Construction 
 
institution Bank/insurance Nonbank
region 1 Seoul Metropolitan Area Non-Metropolitan Area Seoul Metropolitan Area Non-Metropolitan Area
region 2 speculative non-speculative speculative non-speculative
maturity ~3 3~10 10~ ~3 3~10 10~ ~3 3~10 10~ ~3 3~10 10~ ~3 3~10 10~ ~3 3~10 10~
price level ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~ ~6 6~
LTV0 before 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
LTV1 Sep. 2002 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
LTV2 June 2003 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
LTV3 Oct. 2003 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
LTV4 June 2005 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
LTV5 Nov. 2006 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
LTV6 Nov. 2008 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4
LTV7 July 2009 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
LTV8 Oct. 2009 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
DTI0 before 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DTI1 Aug. 2005 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
DTI2 Mar. 2006 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
DTI3 Nov. 2006 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
DTI4 Feb. 2007 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
DTI5 Aug. 2007 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4
DTI6 Nov. 2008 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4
DTI7 Sep. 2009 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4
DTI8 Aug. 2010 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
institution 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
region 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
region 2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1
maturity 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
price level 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0.41 1.0 starting value 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5                   
0.83 1.0 Sep. 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                   
0.86 1.0 June 2003 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                   
0.97 1.0 Oct. 2003 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                   
0.98 1.0 June 2005 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                   
0.98 1.0 Nov. 2006 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1.5  1.5  1.5             
0.04 0.1 Nov. 2008 2 2 2 2 1 2                               
0.54 1.0 July 2009 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5                         
0.76 1.0 Oct. 2009 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5       2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5       
0.00 0.0 starting value                                     
0.03 0.1 Aug. 2005 2 2 2 2 2 2             2 2 2 2 2 2             
0.05 1.0 Mar. 2006  2  2  2              2  2  2             
0.09 1.0 Nov. 2006  2  2  2  2  2  2        2  2  2  2  2  2       
0.63 1.0 Feb. 2007 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2        2  2  2  2  2  2       
0.68 1.0 Aug. 2007 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2       1 2 1 2 1 2  2  2  2       
0.07 0.1 Nov. 2008 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5 2       1 2 1 2 1 2  2  2  2       
0.86 1.0 Sep. 2009 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2       1 2 1 2 1 2  2  2  2       




Notes: A score of 1, 1.5, or 2 is assigned for a ratio limit of 60, 50, and 40 percent, respectively. The score is set at 0 for other levels. The index is calculated as the weighted average of these scores 
where the weights are the measures related to the coverage of the rule in terms of type of lender, loan, and property, and regions. These weights include the ratio of mortgage loans by banks, the ratio 
of the number of households in Seoul Metropolitan Area, ratio of number of households in the speculative zones in Seoul, the ratio of mortgage loans with a maturity less than three years, and the 
ratio of the number of households who own a house valued over 600 million won. When regulations are loosened, only Gangnam Three is kept as the area for which the rules are applicable and an 









Increase in minimum down-payment 
requirements for insured loans from 0 to 5 
percent, reduction in the maximum LTV to 85 
percent when refinancing
Finland Recommendations for LTV limit of 90 percent
Hong Kong SAR Tightening of rules on LTV and DTI that have 
been in effect since the early 2000s
Hungary
Introduction of LTV limit of 75 percent on all 
mortgage loans, restriction of covered bonds 
funding to loans with an LTV of 70 percent or 
lower
India Introduction of LTV limit of 80 percent for 
residential real estate loans
Israel Guidelines requiring increased provisions for 
mortgages with LTV higher than 60 percent
Korea Tightening of rules on LTV and DTI that have 
been in effect since the early 2000s
Malaysia Limit LTV on third homes to 70 percent
Netherlands
Introduction of maximum LTV of 112 percent 
with the portion exceeding 100 percent being 
redeemed in 7 years
Norway Guidelines to limit LTV to 90 percent
Singapore Tightening of rules on LTV that have been in 
effect since the early 2000s
Sweden Introduction of the maximum LTV of 85 percent
Sources: Crowe et al. (2011), IMF (2011), and references therein.
Table 1. After the Storm: Examples of LTV and DTI Limits as Macro-
Prudential Tools after the Global Financial Crisis
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Table 2a. Timeline of LTV Regulations  
Date Specification Range of Application Direction 
Sept. 







- Reduced the LTV from 60 to 50 percent for loans of 3 years 






- Reduced the LTV from 50 to 40 percent for loans of 10 








- Raised the LTV from 60 to 70 percent for loans of 10 years 






- Reduced the LTV from 60 to 40 percent for loans of 10 
years and less maturity to buy houses worth 600 million won 






- Set the LTV ceiling as 50 percent for loans of 10 years and 
less maturity to buy houses worth 600 million won and more 
in the speculative zones and originated by nonbank financial 
institutions such as mutual credits, mutual savings banks, and 










- Reduced the LTV from 60 to 50 percent for loans to buy 
houses worth 600 million won and more in the metropolitan 
area  
Banks Tighten 









Table 2b. Timeline of DTI Regulations 
Date Specification Range of Application Direction 
Aug. 
2005 
- Introduced the DTI ceiling as 40 percent for loans used to 
buy houses in the speculative zones only if the borrower is 
single and under the age of 30 or if the borrower is married 





- Set the DTI ceiling as 40 percent for loans to buy houses 





- Extended the range of application of DTI regulation to the 





- Set the DTI ceiling as 40~60 percent for loans to buy 
houses worth 600 million won and less Banks Tighten 
Aug. 
2007 
- Set the DTI ceiling as 40~70 percent for loans originated by 
nonbank financial institutions such as insurance companies, 








- Removed all areas except the three Gangnam districts off 
the list of speculative zones (so, the DTI regulation does not 





- Extended the range of application of DTI regulation to the 
non- speculative zones in Seoul and the metropolitan area 
(Gangnam Three 40 percent, non-speculative zones in Seoul 




- Exempted the loans to buy houses in the non-speculative 
zones of the metropolitan area if the debtor owns less than 
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Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro
LTV interventions
Six months prior -0.171 -0.151 2.108 5.081 0.008 0.014 -5.227 -6.513**
[0.260] [0.306] [4.808] [3.849] [0.085] [0.111] [7.760] [3.217]
Three months prior 0.526** 0.218 6.464 -1.330 -0.094 -0.003 -21.636*** -3.724**
[0.247] [0.178] [5.968] [5.024] [0.089] [0.081] [8.070] [1.714]
One month prior -0.117 -0.110 -1.581 1.780 0.022 0.409*** 22.076*** -1.311
[0.207] [0.268] [5.687] [4.180] [0.113] [0.127] [6.176] [2.402]
At announcement 0.903* 0.057 8.826* 4.411** 0.226*** 0.028 -8.235 1.428
[0.512] [0.267] [5.204] [1.879] [0.062] [0.168] [11.299] [2.274]
One month later -1.133** 0.291 -15.019** -5.365* -0.078 -0.128 25.000 7.170
[0.463] [0.300] [7.115] [2.836] [0.159] [0.158] [19.942] [6.412]
Three months later -0.715** 0.235 -15.697** -7.566** -0.067 -0.112 12.151 0.936
[0.319] [0.266] [6.344] [3.208] [0.105] [0.124] [8.102] [3.283]
Six months later -0.537** 0.393 -6.201 -2.165 -0.001 -0.067 10.227* -0.761
[0.248] [0.289] [5.001] [3.205] [0.098] [0.092] [6.013] [2.681]
DTI interventions
Six months prior 0.451 0.283 -2.473 1.601 0.132 0.152 -8.365 0.094
[0.350] [0.185] [6.600] [2.585] [0.117] [0.094] [8.343] [2.071]
Three months prior 0.557 0.104 3.264 0.951 0.220* 0.155* -15.888* 1.213
[0.416] [0.120] [7.661] [3.041] [0.116] [0.092] [9.471] [1.672]
One month prior -0.101 0.522 -2.693 1.448 0.351*** 0.037 -12.155*** 3.424
[0.146] [0.397] [7.038] [3.721] [0.075] [0.140] [3.844] [5.154]
At announcement 0.774 0.240 15.889** -1.427 0.089 0.056 -19.957 4.124
[1.030] [0.162] [7.816] [4.394] [0.154] [0.122] [21.075] [3.008]
One month later -0.533 0.252 -25.757*** -9.923** 0.022 0.123 20.175** -5.096
[0.492] [0.237] [5.769] [3.900] [0.155] [0.169] [8.843] [3.281]
Three months later -0.509 0.239 -21.163*** -7.307** -0.205* -0.059 20.507** 3.213
[0.368] [0.244] [4.860] [2.999] [0.114] [0.087] [8.059] [1.934]
Six months later -0.420 0.281 -10.543* -5.398** -0.267*** -0.114 13.438 2.424
[0.337] [0.268] [5.440] [2.711] [0.080] [0.090] [8.312] [1.987]
Table 3a. Housing and Mortgage Market Activity Before and After Tightening
House Prices Transactions Seller Dominance
Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. Sample period covers from January 2000 to December 2010. The dependent variables are the log 
change in real house prices, number of transactions, and household debt level, in each respective column. LTV and DTI intervention variables 
are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 for the respective periods before/following the intervention. In each regression, only two 
dummies (one for LTV and one for DTI) are included. In all regressions, lagged house price change, mortgage loan rate, and log changes in the 
money supply (M2), in unsold inventory of properties, in the composite index of coincident indicators (a measure of the business cycle) and in 
the KOSPI are included as controls. 'Metro' refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 'Non-Metro' are all remaining areas. Newey-West standard 
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Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro
LTV interventions
Six months prior -0.314 -0.169 -5.321 -8.371* 0.234* -0.229* 11.526 -4.125
[0.393] [0.217] [12.179] [4.480] [0.165] [0.137] [7.222] [7.755]
Three months prior -0.468 -0.372* -20.348 -10.021* 0.465*** -0.031 8.547 -12.855***
[0.337] [0.200] [13.291] [5.346] [0.088] [0.078] [5.217] [3.486]
One month prior 0.315 -0.461** 1.527 -6.677 0.270 -0.184 -14.976 -6.354
[0.451] [0.181] [8.924] [4.531] [0.165] [0.130] [11.645] [7.316]
At announcement -0.751*** 0.267** 33.220*** 10.701*** 0.535*** -0.062 5.198 -4.474
[0.154] [0.103] [3.314] [2.328] [0.117] [0.067] [3.375] [2.920]
One month later 0.484*** 0.177 -6.158 0.333 -0.017 0.054 8.037** -9.927***
[0.161] [0.108] [3.958] [2.261] [0.143] [0.060] [3.606] [2.666]
Three months later -0.095 -0.026 -9.624** 6.264* -0.345*** 0.016 10.441*** 0.876
[0.238] [0.157] [4.536] [3.259] [0.106] [0.073] [3.811] [4.244]
Six months later -0.379 -0.162 -11.560** 3.781 -0.271* -0.094 13.960*** -1.583
[0.288] [0.223] [4.893] [3.298] [0.160] [0.100] [4.310] [3.829]
DTI interventions
Six months prior 0.085 0.480** -5.281 -1.487 -0.006 -0.071 2.823 2.836
[0.213] [0.229] [7.311] [3.548] [0.088] [0.152] [5.320] [2.524]
Three months prior 0.232 0.282 -11.123 -2.911 0.101 0.195* 3.236 4.633*
[0.204] [0.182] [8.348] [3.301] [0.091] [0.103] [6.824] [2.430]
One month prior -0.137 1.637 -15.269* -10.216*** -0.047 -0.255 1.999 12.970***
[0.236] [1.165] [8.132] [3.585] [0.096] [0.179] [5.025] [3.940]
At announcement -0.064 0.068 -9.424 -3.415 -0.066 -0.006 -4.325 -6.489
[0.239] [0.224] [7.596] [4.027] [0.098] [0.171] [4.483] [4.819]
One month later -0.788*** 0.231 -2.598 3.070 0.034 0.079 2.054 -0.297
[0.165] [0.463] [5.129] [7.706] [0.055] [0.138] [5.496] [2.647]
Three months later -0.150 -1.188 10.520* 5.908 0.216*** 0.242** 2.102 -6.358*
[0.403] [0.721] [6.065] [4.320] [0.076] [0.122] [5.016] [3.406]
Six months later -0.224 -1.037 16.519*** 4.726 0.197* 0.263** -0.356 -4.075
[0.301] [0.668] [5.963] [5.335] [0.107] [0.118] [6.067] [3.104]
Table 3b. Housing and Mortgage Market Activity Before and After Loosening
House Prices Transactions Seller Dominance
Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. Sample period covers from January 2000 to December 2010. The dependent variables are the log 
change in real house prices, number of transactions, and household debt level, in each respective column. LTV and DTI intervention variables 
are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 for the respective periods before/following the intervention. In each regression, only two 
dummies (one for LTV and one for DTI) are included. In all regressions, lagged house price change, mortgage loan rate, and log changes in the 
money supply (M2), in unsold inventory of properties, in the composite index of coincident indicators (a measure of the business cycle) and in 
the KOSPI are included as controls. 'Metro' refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 'Non-Metro' are all remaining areas. Newey-West standard 
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Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro
LTV interventions
LTV, September 2002 -1.917*** -8.351 39.067**
[0.505] [9.303] [19.654]
LTV, June 2003 -0.808** -0.076 -11.272 -9.460* -0.354*** 13.413 21.898***
[0.358] [0.541] [10.915] [5.045] [0.097] [8.401] [4.491]
LTV, October 2003 -0.750** 0.148 -4.960 -1.880 -0.200 -0.045 17.687*** -12.214***
[0.0.300] [0.295] [11.891] [5.077] [0.142] [0.079] [5.524] [2.950]
LTV, June 2005 -0.688** 0.441 -2.325 0.203 -0.234 0.134** 6.289 4.596
[0.294] [0.378] [13.240] [7.996] [0.162] [0.077] [7.139] [3.605]
LTV, July 2009 0.100 0.306 -13.794 -8.936*** -0.417* -0.033 -1.492 2.340
[0.250] [0.224] [10.290] [3.390] [0.235] [0.268] [5.098] [1.922]
DTI interventions
DTI, August 2005 -0.022 -0.394 -7.134 -5.740 -0.151 -0.178** 14.166 0.032
[0.291] [0.428] [9.121] [5.121] [0.154] [0.084] [8.582] [3.331]
DTI, March 2006 -0.292 0.400 -8.569 -7.348 0.209 0.060 7.173 2.917
[0.477] [0.413] [10.763] [5.812] [0.157] [0.098] [9.584] [3.359]
DTI, November 2006 -1.297** 0.042 -28.108*** -8.041 -0.408 0.114 31.607*** 3.157**
[0.509] [0.113] [8.617] [5.539] [0.253] [0.115] [11.968] [1.289]
DTI, February 2007 -0.353 -0.168 1.578 -2.160 -0.489* -0.405** 7.378 2.427
[0.449] [0.109] [6.565] [3.871] [0.247] [0.177] [11.615] [1.568]
DTI, September 2009 -0.171 0.606 -0.924 3.969 -0.126 -0.232 6.439 -0.493
[0.216] [0.400] [10.492] [2.764] [0.093] [0.188] [6.399] [2.398]
House Prices Transactions Seller Dominance
Table 4a. Housing and Mortgage Market Activity Before and After Tightening: Separate Dummies
Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. Sample period covers from January 2000 to December 2010. The dependent variables are the log 
change in real house prices, number of transactions, and household debt level, in each respective column. LTV and DTI intervention variables 
are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 for the six periods following the intervention. In all regressions, lagged house price change, 
mortgage loan rate, and log changes in the money supply (M2), in unsold inventory of properties, in the composite index of coincident 
indicators (a measure of the business cycle) and in the KOSPI are included as controls. 'Metro' refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 'Non-
Metro' are all remaining areas. Newey-West standard errors, with maximum lag of 2, are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance 















Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro Metro Non-Metro
LTV interventions
LTV, March 2004 -0.335 -0.137 -11.254** 3.565 -0.270* -0.099 13.301*** -1.476
[0.291] [0.204] [4.883] [3.153] [0.161] [0.102] [4.425] [3.863]
DTI interventions
DTI, November 2008 -0.835** -0.160 12.263 -2.808 0.232 0.060 8.434 -0.334
[0.403] [0.249] [10.197] [6.952] [0.201] [0.141] [9.731] [4.066]
DTI, August 2010 0.147 -1.978 19.099*** 12.816*** 0.175** 0.481*** -5.507 -8.092
[0.237] [1.351] [6.481] [3.970] [0.086] [0.135] [5.151] [5.779]
Table 4b. Housing and Mortgage Market Activity Before and After Loosening: Separate Dummies
House Prices Transactions Seller Dominance
Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. Sample period covers from January 2000 to December 2010. The dependent variables are the log 
change in real house prices, number of transactions, and household debt level, in each respective column. LTV and DTI intervention variables 
are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 for the six periods following the intervention. In all regressions, lagged house price change, 
mortgage loan rate, and log changes in the money supply (M2), in unsold inventory of properties, in the composite index of coincident 
indicators (a measure of the business cycle) and in the KOSPI are included as controls. 'Metro' refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 'Non-
Metro' are all remaining areas. Newey-West standard errors, with maximum lag of 2, are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance 










Treated Untreated p-value Treated Untreated p-value
Income 2.99 2.76 0.00 1.80 1.82 0.16
Financial assets 62.54 47.25 0.00 21.35 22.15 0.11
Debt 36.79 28.17 0.00 13.18 13.38 0.19
Property price 144.53 111.93 0.00 51.29 52.28 0.26
Table 5. Survey Data: Summary Statistics Before and After Matching
Notes: 'Treated' are the households for whom the tightening of LTV/DTI regulation is 







SATE SATT SATE SATT
Demand -0.045*** -0.021 -0.023** -0.005
[0.015] [0.0137] [0.012] [0.010]
Upward price expectation -0.056** -0.065*** 0.087*** 0.132***
[0.024] [0.021] [0.018] [0.016]
Expected price appreciation -1.005** -1.613*** 1.237*** 1.943***
[0.459] [0.430] [0.355] [0.327]
Table 6. Effect of Policy Tightening on Household Decisions
Notes: SATE stands for sample average treatment effect (aka experimental treatment 
average). SATT stands for sample average treatment effect for the treated. Treated are the 
households for whom the tightening of LTV/DTI regulation is applicable. 'Demand' is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if the household is planning to purchase a property over 
the course of the coming year. 'Upward price expectation' is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of 1 if the household is expecting house prices to go up over the course of the 
coming year. 'Expected price expectation', expressed in percent, is what the households 
expect the change in house prices to be over the course of the coming year. The estimates are 
corrected for the bias due to inexact matching in finite samples. Standard errors are in square 
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SATE SATT SATE SATT SATE SATT SATE SATT
Young versus Old
Demand -0.040 -0.028 -0.023 0.013 -0.037** -0.027* -0.027** -0.016
[0.034] [0.034] [0.028] [0.026] [0.016] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012]
Upward price expectation -0.121** -0.083* 0.048 0.143*** -0.060** -0.042* 0.095*** 0.134***
[0.050] [0.049] [0.043] [0.037] [0.024] [0.024] [0.018] [0.017]
Expected price appreciation -1.873* -1.409 1.548* 2.382*** -0.955** -1.346*** 1.450*** 1.862***
[1.035] [0.894] [0.900] [0.746] [0.483] [0.476] [0.351] [0.359]
First-time home buyers versus speculators
Demand -0.038 -0.011 -0.014 0.007 -0.062*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.019
[0.031] [0.020] [0.025] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.012]
Upward price expectation -0.021 -0.085*** 0.118*** 0.101*** -0.078** -0.046 0.080*** 0.170***
[0.041] [0.026] [0.034] [0.020] [0.035] [0.036] [0.027] [0.026]
Expected price appreciation -0.420 -1.862*** 2.172*** 1.693*** -1.427** -1.148* 0.879* 2.155***
[0.873] [0.569] [0.734] [0.433] [0.620] [0.619] [0.489] [0.476]
Table 7. Effect of Policy Tightening on Different Household Groups
LTV DTI
Notes: SATE stands for sample average treatment effect (aka experimental treatment average). SATT stands for sample average treatment effect for the treated. 
Treated are the households for whom the tightening of LTV/DTI regulation is applicable. 'Demand' is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the household 
is planning to purchase a property over the course of the coming year. 'Upward price expectation' is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the household 
is expecting house prices to go up over the course of the coming year. 'Expected price expectation', expressed in percent, is what the households expect the change 
in house prices to be over the course of the coming year. Young versus old distinction depends on a dummy that is one if the age of the head of household is less 
than or equal to 35. First-time buyers versus speculators are defined based on whether the household currently owns a property or not. The estimates are corrected 
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Figure 1. House Price Cycles in Korea: 2001-2010 

























Jan-01 May-02 Sep-03 Jan-05 May-06 Sep-07 Jan-09 May-10
Figure 2. Policy Interventions: LTV and DTI Adjustments 
Intervention: Tighten Intervention: Loosen
Real house prices (Year-on-year change, percent, LHS) Real house prices (Index, Jan. 2005=100)





























































































Prices Transactions Mortgages Seller dominance
Figure 3. Housing and Mortgage Market Activity following Policy Interventions
Dif ference between average growth rate during the six-month period before and af ter the LTV rule change
Dif ference between average growth rate during the six-month period before and af ter the DTI rule change
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